Hmm. It doesn’t?

If the point is to avoid the actual suffering of the organism, there are three possible justifications: (1) it’s an arbitrary act with no actual purpose or significance, (2) suffering on the part of the organism is best avoided, for the organism’s sake, and/or (3) suffering on the part of the organism is best avoided, for the sake of the one killing the organism. In the case of (1), the act is meaningless, from an ethical standpoint; and in the cases of (2) and (3), it problematizes the issue of sentience instead of removing it, even if no suffering occurs, by acknowledging that there’s a reason to avoid the infliction of pain.

Generally speaking, people don’t seem to argue for pain- or stress-free, or pain- or stress-reducing, methods of killing on the basis of (1). It’s usually (2) and/or (3). So no, it isn’t removed. It’s problematized.

I think at that point the question is about something else than sentience and suffering, it is about this: is sentient life inherently more valuable than non-sentient life?

Which is basically what I’d argued earlier: that the crucial point is what the existence of sentience implies, and how this relates (or doesn’t) to the issues of consciousness and agency. And that’s where the arguments tend to weaken.

The bivalve question is a good example of why: if the presence of a nervous system as such, along with some evidence of reaction to noxious stimuli, is enough to establish sentience, then what cause is there to draw the line at structure? If there’s a functional equivalent present, as there seems to be in at least some plant species, then there’s no compelling reason to exclude plants as a whole from the sentient category. One has to have recourse to a distinction that is either (1) arbitrary or (2) a diluted form of anthropocentrism, defining sentience based upon structural similarity to what we believe provides the basis for our sentience — and neither option is a compelling basis for a sentience-based ethics. (And an argument that would rely upon the ability to observe reactions to noxious stimuli would essentially amount to an argument from ignorance, which would be even less compelling.)

All of which goes back to the points I tried to raise in #26. Without addressing these issues, the supporting arguments for such an ethics fail to achieve solidity, and fail to be persuasive enough for widespread adoption.

Except that it doesn’t actually remove it…. So the question of whether or not it is ethical to kill and consume a sentient organism in the first place is a question that remains in play, and is in fact problematized by the attempt to find a means of addressing it.

Hmm. It doesn’t?

To me the only difference left would be a) killing a being that is never sentient vs b) killing a being that has the capacity to be sentient but is not at the time of being killed. I think at that point the question is about something else than sentience and suffering, it is about this: is sentient life inherently more valuable than non-sentient life? I’m not sure it is from a theoretical point of view, although I’d like to hear arguments, if there are any, but I believe that there certainly is a human projection that sentient life *is* more valuable, based on *our* sentience and empathy?

right, but the “sentience” argument is an argument about suffering (“the effect”) not death per se. The “intent” you refer to is about the killing as such, not about inflicting suffering. So, to me, it seems that removing the “sentience”/suffering aspect from the equation – by talking about “intent” – does in fact remove the difference between plants and animals in this respect.

Except that it doesn’t actually remove it. As noted, what pain- or stress-free methods of killing do is acknowledge the validity of the issue, and then find ways of sidestepping it. (To say that it’s done so as to make the killing easier on those doing it doesn’t avoid this, either; it simply raises the question of why it should be necessary to make it less difficult.) So the question of whether or not it is ethical to kill and consume a sentient organism in the first place is a question that remains in play, and is in fact problematized by the attempt to find a means of addressing it.

I suppose there are a lot of individual lines, but I doubt there can be a generally accepted (logically supported) one.

I’d argue that it isn’t about individual lines; it’s more that the line is going to be nuanced, not clearly drawn. So, fine lines, not bright ones. But this doesn’t mean that a fine line is incompatible with general acceptance. Only that it’s incompatible with broad, sweeping arguments, and that the arguments have to be well-developed and well-supported if they’re going to have any real chance of being persuasive.

My point in mentioning that was to point out that it actually is discussed; just that you might not have been aware of it, seeing as (by your own admission) you haven’t engaged in on-line discussions regarding the subject.

fair.

The effect may be avoided, but the intent remains, which is not the case with roadkill, freegan-sourced food, or brain dead animals.

right, but the “sentience” argument is an argument about suffering (“the effect”) not death per se. The “intent” you refer to is about the killing as such, not about inflicting suffering. So, to me, it seems that removing the “sentience”/suffering aspect from the equation – by talking about “intent” – does in fact remove the difference between plants and animals in this respect.

So, although there may be no bright line that can be drawn, that does not imply the inability to draw any line at all

I suppose there are a lot of individual lines, but I doubt there can be a generally accepted (logically supported) one.

My point in mentioning that was to point out that it actually is discussed; just that you might not have been aware of it, seeing as (by your own admission) you haven’t engaged in on-line discussions regarding the subject.

Similarly:

If sentience alone were the argument against eating animals, one would have to assume that vegans would be allowed to kill brain dead animals or eat meat from animals if there were a pain-/stress-free method to kill them.

This relates to the intention argument, and to what Clarisse mentioned about freegan eating. For example, if you check into discussions about roadkill — such as the media coverage of Johnathan McGowan, who lived off of it for 30 years — what you’ll usually find is statements that there’s not much, if anything, ethically wrong with it, seeing as the animals are already dead. Similarly with freegan eating: the meat would otherwise be thrown away, so the ethical issues involved are minimal. Consuming a brain-dead animal wouldn’t be all that different.

However, this does not mean that using a pain- or stress-free method of killing would be in the same category: you might sidestep the infliction of pain, but the fact that you’re employing those methods implicitly or explicitly acknowledges the idea that the organism that you’re killing is, in fact, sentient. The effect may be avoided, but the intent remains, which is not the case with roadkill, freegan-sourced food, or brain dead animals.

So, although there may be no bright line that can be drawn, that does not imply the inability to draw any line at all, and these possibilities do not reduce veganism to the environmental argument. But this is separate from the question of whether or not veganism is a necessary ethical consequence, really; that’s more about what the implications of sentience are, and their relation to (or lack thereof) the issues of consciousness and agency.

my point was that “sentience” is a relative argument, and probably quite valid when it comes to “harm reduction”, while I believe the absolute argument about “killing for transient pleasure” is not, as eating plants also requires killing, and for the absolute argument, death is a binary state. If sentience alone were the argument against eating animals, one would have to assume that vegans would be allowed to kill brain dead animals or eat meat from animals if there were a pain-/stress-free method to kill them.

My point is that, since killing is inevitable for survival, there is no clear cut line that draws itself that separates ethical dietary habits from non-ethical dietary habits. From that point of view, veganism is just one attempt to reduce the environmental “harm” caused by one’s existence, not the only logical ethical consequence.

After a little more contact all the ramifications, the complexity of the topic itself and the comings and goings started to give me a headache just trying to explore all the possibilities, all the considerations.

Seeing you do the same with the attached stigmatization and being judged or not understood as I did in the beginning (I still reserve the right to do it from time to time :P) is just amazing.

So again, thanks for taking the time to explain.

I don’t have the impression that this is a problem something that is discussed openly among vegans, and if brought up, it is usually dismissed.

I haven’t come across it discussed in depth much, but my understanding of it is this: plants aren’t structurally capable of sentience in the way that animals are, so the attempt to elevate both plants and animals to the same level on this issue fails. But that’s where questions like “is it acceptable to eat bivalves?” come in, because there’s the question of whether or not a nervous system is sufficient on its own, if the threshold is defined by a certain level of complexity (as in the case of crustaceans), or if the presence of a brain as such is required for the centralization of sentience.

Plants are capable of responding to their environment, may have a chemical equivalent of nervous system function, and they do respond to damage (e.g., elevated proline levels). But the argument is essentially that since this does not occur in the context of a nervous system, much less one of sufficient complexity, plants are not, properly speaking, sentient; so this isn’t an argument against consuming them.

@Flaw — Has there been, for the same standard of conclusive scientific reasons, an argument for being vegan?

Oh come on. There’s no conclusive scientific argument against raping people.

Well you specifically mentioned there wasn’t a scientific reason not too and the wording seemed to imply “See science says good!”. However you could also have written that there is no scientific reason to be vegan, which is as equally correct and misleading (“Science says bad!”).

Also nutritional needs is very much scientific. Im not sure about the rape comment though, seems either silencing or a bit rape culture coming through, slight gut wrench when reading it.

Your mileage, as with all things, will vary.

Which I said in the post.

I was refering to my own writing in my post, apologies for the confusion.

I also find the consent argument problematic. Who would consent to being killed to be eaten. And doesn’t your argument basically say that it’s ok to kill plants for food because they cannot communicate their lack of consent to being killed for someone’s transient pleasure? I find that to be an odd consent argument, if I understand it correctly. As cheesy as it sounds, death is necessary for someone else’s survival, and I do not believe that’s something that can be dealt with through “consent”. And since some death is a necessary condition of survival, all eating is necessarily speciecist.

That is, of course, not in itself and argument against a vegan diet, and a lot of the *relative* points about pain and suffering and environmental damage are very much relevant. But even there, it’s seems that the silence of plants as opposed to the audible and visible suffering of animals, seems to create an emotional bias that I’m not sure is morally justified. It *is* harder to kill an animal than to kill a plant.

I don’t have the impression that this is a problem something that is discussed openly among vegans, and if brought up, it is usually dismissed. Although I have to say that I have not had a single online discussion about veganism, only real life ones, so maybe there is online discussion about this.

Animals can’t consent? Have you ever tried to make an animal do something it doesn’t want to do, or harm an animal? They usually communicate pretty clearly that they don’t like it. Plants don’t.

Well, that’s where things get tricky, isn’t it? It comes down to the question of whether consent can only exist in the context of consciousness, or if sentience is sufficient, or if other things — such as self-aware nociception in the absence of reflective consciousness, or the phenomenon of resistance — establish a middle ground. Which is further complicated by what we recognize as the communication of pain and/or resistance, and how we can and cannot establish the existence of awareness (reflective or otherwise, and in terms of how it might differ from perception as such). It’s really the question of whether or not any given species is an agent in the sense that’s required for consent, or if that distinction even matters (which is further complicated by comparisons between different developmental stages and in reference to developmental divergences).

That, I think, is why this ends up being such a sticking point: it’s far more complicated than the arguments often make it out to be, especially when consent is defined as something along the lines of “assent or agreement, given in the context of the ability to choose, with deliberation and self-awareness, to do otherwise.” Arguably, when done without addressing issues such as those mentioned above, connecting consent with the phenomenon of resistance can, instead of extending consent to animals, redefine what consent means in the human context — and do so in the direction of making it into a weaker concept, by severing its connections with self-awareness, reflective consciousness, and agency.

Animals can’t consent? Have you ever tried to make an animal do something it doesn’t want to do, or harm an animal? They usually communicate pretty clearly that they don’t like it. Plants don’t.

Additionally, we’ve currently bred or otherwise modified genetics such that milk producing cows NEED to be milked, or else their udders drag on the ground and they get all kinds of nasty infections and diseases.

One person going vegan isn’t going to remove the milking of cows in the dairy industry. Hundreds of people going vegan won’t, either. Arguments that claim veganism will cause the collapse of the food industry or problems for animals that are currently in the food industry simply aren’t realistic. If a lot of people go vegan, then it will happen slowly, and then the food industry will adjust to support them slowly.

Caring about the kinds of animals that produce my food, making sure that I buy only from farms where the animals are treated well, killed humanely, etc – to me, that’s the transparently right thing to do.

Thank you for doing that. I think that’s quite reasonable.

@Scootah — In terms of consent related ethics, I have very substantial issues with the political and practical ethics of the Australian Wheat farming industry and the US Corn farming industry, both of whom are directly supported by every vegan diet I’ve ever encountered.

Again, I’m on board with this. I just see veganism as currently much easier to observe than a lot of other food ethics stuff, so I observe veganism.